Introduction: The Search For Inclusive Citizenship: Meanings And Expressions In An Interconnected World by Kabeer, Naila
Although the idea of citizenship is nearly universal today, what it means
and how it is experienced are not. Nor have they ever been. As a
reading of the literature quickly reveals, the history of citizenship in
both north and south has been a history of struggle over how it is to be
defined and who it is to include. However, what is also clear is that a
great deal of the theoretical debate about citizenship today is taking
place in an ‘empirical void’ (Lister and others, this volume), where the
views and perspectives of ‘ordinary’ citizens are largely absent. We do
not know what citizenship means to people – particularly people whose
status as citizens is either non-existent or extremely precarious – nor
what these meanings tell us about the goal of building inclusive
societies.
The contributions to this volume go some way towards addressing
this void. They explore the meanings and experiences of citizenship in
different parts of the world, giving particular attention to the
perspectives of the poor and socially excluded. Their contributions thus
touch on the different mechanics of exclusion which consign certain
groups within a society to the status of lesser citizens or of non-citizen,
and on the struggles by such groups to redefine, extend and transform
‘given’ ideas about rights, duties and citizenship. They therefore help to
shed light on what inclusive citizenship might mean when it is viewed
from the standpoint of the excluded. They also touch on some of the
important debates in the field of citizenship studies.
These debates have tended to be conducted as a series of binary
oppositions, in which one term in the opposition is associated with
classical liberal theory, and, by extension, ‘Western’ theory, while the
other term reflects a critique of that theory from a variety of different
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political, cultural and philosophical traditions (see Stammers). Classical
liberal theory claims that all human beings have rights by virtue of their
humanity: such rights are consequently universal. One set of debates in
the field of citizenship studies challenges this claim to universalism with
a counter-claim of the particularity or cultural relativism of rights.
Classical liberal theory takes the individual as conceptually and
ontologically prior to society and hence the ultimate bearer of these
rights, regardless of their status in society. A second set of debates
challenges the idea of individual rights by pointing to contexts in which
it is the rights of groups which are relevant and which should take
priority over the rights of individuals.
Classical liberal theory recognizes civil and political rights as the only
‘true’ rights because they promote the freedorn of individuals to act.
The duty of the state is to defend this freedom. Social and economic
rights are seen as entailing excessive state intervention, drawing on
public resources and hence constituting an infringement of individual
liberty. A third set of debates challenges this view and suggests that
economic. social and cultural rights give substance to political and civil
rights for the poor and marginalized: these different categories of rights
are therefore interdependent and indivisible.
A fourth set of debates touched on in this book concerns the
relationship between rights and duties. While liberal theory has always
recognized that rights carry correlative duties, classical liberal theory
treated rights as unconditional and hence prior to duties. Individuals
enjoyed rights by virtue of their citizenship, regardless of whether they
owned property, participated in public life, paid taxes or any of the
other qualifications associated, for instance, with republican notions of
citizenship. This has been challenged in recent times by neo-liberal
thinkers for whom citizens must ‘earn’ their rights and for whom,
therefore, duties precede rights. A number of contributions in this book
consider the implications of this revised emphasis for patterns of
inclusion and exclusion in the practice of citizenship.
In the rest of this introductory chapter, I will be elaborating on these
points in greater detail in order to draw out some of the unifying themes
of The +book. The next section explores some of the values and
meanings associated with the idea of citizenship in the different
narratives which appear in the book. The third section considers how
key debates about citizenship, rights and duties have been interpreted
by the authors in this book in the light of these values and meanings. the
fourth section discusses the emergence of an explicit rights-based
approach within the development agenda, and the challenges associated
with its implementation. The final section draws together various
Kabeer 01  11/9/04  10:22 am  Page 2
Introduction \ 3
strands of the discussion to consider what they suggest about the
meaning of citizenship from the standpoint of excluded groups.
Values and meanings in the expression of citizenship
The narratives about citizenship in this book offer us certain insights
into how excluded groups define themselves in different contexts, how
they see themselves in relation to others and what this implies for their
understanding of citizenship in the world as they know it. While their
experiences clearly vary a great deal both by context and by the nature
of their exclusion, their testimonies and actions suggest there are certain
values that people associate with the idea of citizenship which cut across
the various boundaries that divide them. These values may not be
universal but they are widespread enough to suggest that they constitute
a significant aspect of the organization of collective life and of the way
in which people connect with each other. And because they are being
expressed by groups who have experienced exclusion in some form or
other, these values also articulate their vision of what a more inclusive
society might imply.
Justice
First and foremost, the ideas about citizenship to be found in these
articles express adherence to some notion of justice. This is not the
retributive notion of justice – or revenge – which Rentlen (1990), for
instance, claims has near-universal status, but rather a notion of justice
which revolves around when it is fair for people to be treated the same
and when it is fair that they should be treated differently. The villagers
who mode up the audience for the various scenarios about citizenship
enacted by the Theatre for Development in Nigeria prioritized
ethnicity as the basis of their identity and their primary affiliation (Abah
and Okwori). Nevertheless they protested at examples where
individuals were discriminated against by those in authority on grounds
of their ethnicity. Whatever their own particular affiliation, they
expected the state and its representatives to act fairly and impartially
towards its citizens.
In the state of Tennessee in the United States, the campaign to give
undocumented immigrants, or ‘non-citizens’, the right to a driver’s
licence was couched for pragmatic reasons as a matter of the health and
safety of the citizens of Tennessee, but it was also used to open up a
public dialogue in which the very visible labour contributions that
undocumented immigrants made to the prosperity of the state could be
compared to the lock of rights and recognition accorded to them by
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that state (Ansley). It was the search for justice which led members of
the Wallacedene community in South Africa to seek enforcement of the
constitutional right to housing in the highest court of the land
(Williams). For some, their claims were based on the principle of
equivalence with others: ‘We want suitable houses to be built for us like
it is happening elsewhere’. For others, their claims reflected a more
historical sense of equivalence: that they should be restored to their
rightful land and place in society now that the apartheid state was gone.
For the landless women and men organized by Mjera Kori in Bangla-
desh, the knowledge that the constitution of the country recognized
their rights to basic food, land, shelter, education and health was the
basis of their struggle for equality, for ‘substantive’ rather than formal
citizenship (Kabeer). For Naripokkho, a feminist organization in
Bangladesh, the constitution itself was found to be flowed because it
allowed religion to dictate the lesser status of women (Huq). However,
while the organisation wanted equality before the low for women – a
uniform civil code – it also wanted the state to recognize what was
‘different’ about women and what this implied for low, for policy and
for their citizenship.
Recognition
This raises a second set of values associated with the idea of citizenship
in the narratives in this book. Closely bound up with the demands for
justice by many disempowered groups is demand for recognition
recognition of the intrinsic worth of all human being but also
recognition and respect for their differences. There are, as Fraser (1997)
points out, forms of injustice which are rooted in hegemonic cultural
definitions which deny full personhood to certain groups, definitions
which may be formalized in low or built into policy. The search for
recognition by such groups often first takes the form of the demand for
what Hannah Arendt (1986) called ‘the right to have rights’, to be
recognized as full persons, despite their difference, and hence as full
citizens. Thus, for members of Naripokkho, as Huq points out: ‘Our
experience of discrimination as women led us to demand fair treatment
end respect for our dignity as human beings, and only thereafter to
claim our rights end entitlements as citizens’.
The ‘right to have rights’ was at the heart of the Zapatista struggle
(Cortez): their demand for the right to difference was encapsulated in
the vision of the world they aspired to achieve:
In the world of the powerful there is no space for anyone but themselves
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and their servants. In the world we want everyone fits. In the world
we want many worlds to fit. The nation which we construct is one
where all communities and languages fit, where all steps may walk,
where all may have laughter. where all may live the dew Henriquez and
Rochas, 1996, cited Yudice, p.366).
The agreement they signed with the Mexican government included
acceptance of multicultural education which would refashion the
nation’s culture and history from the perspective of its Indian citizens
because, as a Zapatista memorandum put it ‘By speaking in its Indian
heart, the nation maintains its dignity and its memory’ (Henriquez and
Rochas 1996, cited in Yudice, p.366).
The Zapatistas were able to use their command of some of the most
advanced means of representation available today – the news media and
the Internet – to speak to the global imagination and to mobilize global
support for the historical struggle of Indian community in Mexico for
dignity end respect. Other contributions in this book testify that dignity
and respect are also essential to the idea of citizenship in less visible,
more quotidian moments of life. When residents of the favelas in Brazil
mobilized in the 1980s to demand the right to use the land on which
they lived, their first act was to seek to publicize the results of their own
survey to show the other citizens of their city that they too were decent
hard working citizens – in other words, deserving of rights – rather then
‘idle people, marginals or prostitutes’ as the popular stereotypes suggest
(Dognino, this volume).
However, the power of stereotypes derives from their persistence,
regardless of evidence: the favela residents interviewed by Wheeler some
years later continued to experience their lack of citizenship, not so
much as economic deprivation, but as the lock of respect that
characterized their everyday interactions with society and state: dignity
is everything for a citizen – and we have no dignity. We are treated like
cattle in the clinics, on the buses, and in the shops’.
Self-determination
A third set of values which features in the accounts in this book relates
to self-determination, people’s ability to exercise some degree of control
over their lives. Where rights are seen to promote the capacity for
self-determination, the struggle for rights is expressed in ways that
reflect particular experiences of being denied self-determination. In
many cases, it is the individual’s right to self- determination that is the
object of struggle. As Stammers points out, the right to property was, in
the early struggles for citizenship in Europe, as much about the right to
‘property in oneself ’ as it was about ownership and control over
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resources, and it was claimed as a means of restraining the absolute
power of the monarchy over all persons as well as things within its
realm. Many of the early political and civil rights, including freedom of
movement of religious belief and to dispose of one’s labour and
property, all helped to express and uphold the rights of individuals over
their own lives in this struggle against absolute power.
The desire for individual self-determination is also evident in the
demands of indigenous women in Mexico. As Belausteguigoitia (2000)
notes, the First Declaration of War of the Zapatistas’ National Libera-
tion Army, issued within days of the uprising in January 1994, also
contained the Revolutionary Women’s Laws,which spelt out what
indigenous women considered to be essential to their dignity as human
beings: these included demands about their public participation – the
right to be elected to the community’s decision-making positions, to go
to meetings and to participate in community councils - as well as
demands relating to the private sphere: women’s right to choose whom
they would marry, and when they would marry, also phrased as the
right to go on studying if they wanted), the right not to be beaten
within the home and the demand that, rope within the family be
punished. Not all these demands found their way into the subsequent
agenda of the Zapatista movement, but the opportunity to express them
brought J new hope to women who had hitherto been denied any
voice: ‘Yes, the situation has changed a little. I think that there will be a
time when we, as young women, at least will have the right to decide
what we want to do with our lives, whether we want to study or have
different responsibilities’
In Bangladesh, Naripokkho is concerned with women’s right to self-
determination in a context where, along with gender inequalities in
access to resources such as education, property, jobs, health care and so
on (of the kind which can found in most of the world) patriarchal
power is also exercised through various forms of control over women’s
bodies: how their bodies are defined, what physical activities they are
permitted, what physical space they con occupy and the punitive
actions which are taken against them should they fail to comply with
these strictures.
Not surprisingly, body politics has played a central role in
Naripokkho’s activities in the form of campaigns against violence
against women both within the home and in the public domain;
solidarity with sex workers, transsexuals and other groups whose
marginalization is defined in gendered terms; and advocacy around
health and reproductive services. Naripokkho’s body politics is personal
as well as public: it has led its members to reflect on how they
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experience their own bodies, their own freedom of movement, their
own physical deportment and their own attitudes to sexuality.
Solidarity
A final set of values which emerged out of the narratives about
citizenship in this book is to do with solidarity, the capacity to identify
with others and to act in unity with them in their claims for justice and
recognition. The form that solidarity takes varies, not only according to
the ‘included’ or ‘excluded’ status of particular individuals and groups,
but also the extent to which they hope to transcend their excluded
status. For those who do not have such hope, solidarity con take a very
narrow form, limited only to those who experience the same daily
struggles or, even more narrowly, to one’s own family and kin.
These differing circles of solidarity are evident in the narratives of the
young people interviewed in the British city of Leicester (Lister with
others). While for the majority, who did not necessarily regard them-
selves as ‘outsiders’, the idea of ‘British-ness’ as the basis of citizenship
appeared too remote from their everyday lives to have much resonance,
they did identify citizenship with ability to make a contribution to
society as they understood it. For some, this contribution was defined in
very general terms: participation in paid work or payment of tax. For
others, it was defined more specifically as some form of involvement
with their communities: they defined the ‘good citizen’ in terms of
‘respect’, for themselves, for others and for their environment, and
‘caring’ - looking out for others, helping people in the neighbourhood,
giving something back to society. Significantly, however, those groups
who constituted ‘outsiders’ tended to define their obligations far more
narrowly in terms of looking after themselves or their immediate
families.
Similarly, in the favelal of Rio de Janeiro, strong feelings of alienation
from formal politics and from the idea of ‘Brazilian-ness’ as the basis of
their identity had led residents, who saw themselves as ‘lacking
citizenship’ in the wider society, to define themselves either in relation
to their extended family networks or else in terms of their immediate
neighbourhood, those who shared the some habitat and experienced
the some frustrations (Wheeler).
The elderly black man in Cope Town who explained to Williams
that his neighbourhood wanted support but not welfare from the state
also expressed a solidarity with his immediate community and a desire
for localized forms of self-determination. He wanted the state to respect
the constitutional entitlement of his community to shelter,’ he wanted
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them to be told how things worked and then he want ed that they be
left to get on with their own lives.
However, when solidarity takes more overtly political forms, it is
expressed as a demand for collective self-determination which extends
beyond those who share the frustrations of daily life. Such solidarity
may be on the basis of the shared experience of oppression or it may be
in response to perceived injustice to others. The mobilization of
dispossessed groups historically (Stammers) and today (Kabeer) to
exercise collective power over the terms and conditions on which they
sell their labour; the struggles of indigenous people to claim their place
in their nation’s history (Cortez); the attempts by women’s organiza-
tions to challenge the manifestations of patriarchal power in public and
private domains and thereby redefine the boundaries between the two
(Huq) are all examples of solidarity based on a shared sense of
oppression.
Examples of solidarity based on perceived injustice to others can be
found in the role of external catalysts like Nijera Kori in Bangladesh,
which organized landless men and women to claim their rights
(Kabeer), and MDS in Rajasthan, working with nomadic groups
towards the same end (Pant). Such external catalysts are often critical, as
Pant points out, in situations where disempowerment is manifested as a
lock of agency and organizational capacity. The citizens of Tennessee
who participated in the campaign to provide undocumented migrants
with driving licences were also expressing solidarity in response to
perceived injustice with a group of people who were outside their
immediate circle of family and friends.
And it is worth noting that while the Zapatistas were fighting for the
right to collective self-determination for indigenous communities in
Mexico, they also saw themselves as fighting for the rights of all
marginalized groups, not just in Mexico but in the rest of the world. As
its leading figure put it: ‘Marcos is gay in San Francisco, Black in South
Africa, Asian in Europe, Chicano in San Isidro, anarchist in Spain,
Palestinian in Israel, Indian in the streets of San Cristobal…’ (EZLN,
Documentes y Communicados, 1994, cited in Belousteguigoitia 2000).
Rights and duties in debates around citizenship
The values and meanings of citizenship discussed above are drown from
the narratives of groups who have been assigned a marginal status within
their societies.
They therefore offer a particular standpoint frorn which to consider
some of the central debates in the field of citizenship studies. However,
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just as excluded groups are not homogenous either in the mechanisms
by which they are excluded or in their concrete experience of
exclusion, so too the standpoints that their narratives offer will not
necessarily lead to converging positions on these debates. They may
share similar values at the abstract level – the values described above are,
after all, particular ways of talking about liberty, equality, fraternity, the
‘meta-values’ which inspired the French revolution over two centuries
ago – but these values will be ranked differently and interpreted
differently by different people at different times. In this section, we
consider what the contributions to this book have to say about some of
the key debates in the field of citizenship studies.
Universalism versus particularism
The contributions which touch explicitly on the debate over the
universality versus particularity of human rights acknowledge the
tension between the two positions but suggest that the two sets of
claims con be treated as the abstract and concrete sides of the same coin,
rather than as opposing principles of a dichotomy. In a globally
differentiated world. universalism cannot be taken for granted. It has to
be worked for in different contexts and these different contexts, will
shape the concrete forms that are given to abstract rights. Actor-
oriented approaches to the question of rights make this clear. Such an
approach is captured, for instance, in Mamdani’s argument that rights
are defined by struggle, and that rights-struggles are born of experiences
of deprivation and oppression:
Without the experience of sickness, there can be no idea of health. And
without the fact of oppression, there can be no practice of resistance and
no notion of rights… Wherever there was (and is) oppression – and
Europe had no monopoly over oppression in history – there must come
into being a conception of rights.
(Mamdani, 1989: 1–2 cited in Nyarnu-Musembi)
As Nyamu-Musembi comments: ‘Viewed from this perspective, human
rights are both universal and particular: universal because the experience
of resistance to oppression is shared among subjugated groups the world
over, but also particular because resistance is shaped in response to the
peculiarities of the relevant social context’.
A similar point is mode by Stammers. He notes that the universalist
construction given to rights in the Western context can be traced to the
particularities of the historical struggle of the oppressed against their
oppression within that context. The claim for the universality of
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‘natural’ rights, premised on the universality of the human condition,
served a strategic purpose in challenging prevailing claims to power by
an absolute monarch: ‘Given that claims to absolutist power were
legitimized transcendentally – by monarchs claiming Divine Right – it
is  not hard to see why oppositional social actors would seek to develop
equally strong transcendent claims in efforts to de-legitimize them’.
However, despite the universalism claimed for human rights, he
suggests that whenever rights are instantiated  as the rights of citizens
within specific legal, political and.state formations, they necessarily take
on a ‘particularistic’ form.
Of course, it is widely recognized that the status of human being was
often selectively rather than universally applied, so that even within
Western society itself, citizenship was not a fully inclusive concept:
quite aside from the ‘exclusions from without’ practised on the basis of
slavery and empire, there were exclusions from within on grounds of
gender, class and ethnicity. Nevertheless, the promise of universality
contained in the idea of rights.has proved to be a useful resource for
groups seeking to pursue their claims for justice and recognition.
It was the promise of universalism contained in the idea of human
rights which led to the extension of political franchise to the previously
excluded working class and in turn allowed them to demand the
economic and social rights which would guarantee their access to the
basic necessities of life, independent of their status in the market. This
process of ‘de-commodification’ allowed labour to rescue itself from the
status of just a commodity to be bought and sold in the market place
(Which unregulated market forces were threatening to reduce it to) and
to gain the status and dignity of human beings and citizens (Marshall
1950). As Mehto points out, the language of universal rights may once
again provide an important counter discourse to the neo-liberal
discourse of commodification which dominates current policy agendas
across the world and is being used to legitimate the extension of market
forces to every area of social life, including the provision of basic needs.
Women’s groups throughout the world, including Naripokkho
(although this is not mentioned in Huq’s contribution), have also
responded to the promise of universalism, seeking to re-frame women’s
rights as human rights as a way to underscore their claims for equality
(sameness) and equity (difference). As Bunch with others (2001) note:
‘Human rights language creates a space in which different accounts of
women’s lives and new ways of demanding change can be developed. It
provides a set of overarching principles to frame alternative visions of
gender justice, without dictating the precise content of those visions’
(p.223).
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By using the large body of international conventions, agreements and
commitments as political leverage, women have been able to gain
recognition and ratification for new kinds of rights, rights which reflect
an ‘embodied’ rather than a s disembodied understanding of what it is to
be human, and hence an embodied, rather than an abstract, view of
citizenship. Reproductive rights and recognition of human rights
violations within the family are examples of these new kinds of right,
whose history is tied up with the emergence of women as collective
actors in the public arena and their willingness to challenge pre-defined
notions of the boundaries between public and private.
Individual versus collective rights
However, the implications which con be drawn from some of the
contributions in this book as well as the wider literature on debates
about group versus individual rights, serve to illustrate the continuing
tensions between the universal and the particular (see, for instance,
Kabeer 1 2001). As Parekh (1993) has pointed out, for all its claims to
universalism, liberal individualism as philosophical tradition and legal
practice is the product of a particular history, the history of industrializa-
tion, in a particular context, ‘the West’. Hence its adherence to the idea
of the individual as the bearer of rights which are independent of their
social relations and place in society does not have universal resonance.
Even within the Western tradition, established liberal philosophers such
as Isaiah Berlin (1969) have noted the importance of group identity and
affiliation as an aspect of citizenship for those who have been
marginalized by society.
What oppressed classes or nationalities, as a rule, demand is neither
simply unhampered liberty of action for their members. nor, above
everything, equality of social and economic opportunity, still less
assignment of a place in frictionless, organic state devised by the national
lawgiver. What they want, as often as not, is simply recognition (of their
class or nation or colour or race) as an independent source of human
activity, as an entity with a will of its own, intending to act in accordance
with it ... and not to be ruled, educated, guided ... as being not quite fully
human, and therefore not quite fully free. 
(pp. 156–7, cited in Isin and Wood 1999)
Historically, struggles for national independence in the ‘Western’
context, including the American war for independence, were struggles
for the right to collective self-determination, in this case, by ‘the people’
of the United States. Many of the struggles of workers and socialist
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activists were also struggles for collective rights: the right to organise
and to bargain collectively (Stammers). More recently, the influx of
immigrants from very different cultural backgrounds has given rise to
multicultural engagement with the idea of collective rights. In any case,
Western societies vary considerably between the more solidaristic
cultures which prevail in the Nordic countries and the greater
individualism of the Anglo-Saxon countries, particularly the United
States (Fraser and Gordon 1994).
Nevertheless, these are all societies in which individual rights (ire
solidly enshrined in their constitutions, institutions and cultural
sensibilities and form the backdrop against which much of daily life is
conducted. By contrast, as Parekh notes, individualism as a way of being
has little or no place in societies which have a strong sense of kin and
community ties, where individuals meet their needs on the basis of a
shared morality of claims and obligations and define their identities in
relation to other members of their community: he suggests a number of
Arab and African countries as example. It also runs into problems in
societies which are mode up of multiple communities, each of which
represents affiliations which have greater meaning in the lives of their
members than membership of the larger society.
Most of these societies strive after some balance between individual
and group rights, but with for greater emphasis on collective rights than
in most western societies. In some cases, the balance is between
different spheres of life that certain spheres are governed by liberal
principles of individual equality before the law while others are
governed by religious or tribal principles which may differentiate
between individuals on the basis of age, gender or social status or curtail
certain individual freedoms in the interests of the collective. Pakistan,
for instance, combines primarily individual rights in the economic
sphere with religious low in the sphere of the family. Other countries
may differentiate between different groups, defining certain rights for all
individuals belonging to a particular nation state but according other
rights on the basis of group membership. Group rights may be on the
basis of ethnicity or lineage, as in a number of African states, or on the
basis of religion or caste, as in South Asia.
The recognition of collective rights reflects the reality that in many
situations, individuals. have multiple affiliations, and nationhood may
not be the most important; but it con also result in a fragmented and
divided polity rather than the ‘imagined unity’ which is the basis of
viable nationhood. In Nigeria, for instance, where certain rights of
citizenship are associated with ethnic descent, it is possible to have been
born and spent one’s entire life in a particular state of Nigeria without
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qualifying for such rights in that state. Instead, these rights can only be
sought in the ancestral home state, irrespective of the weakness of ties
retained with that home. Under these circumstances, individuals who
are not indigenes experience various kinds of discrimination: in their
children’s access to school, voting rights and so on.
Not surprisingly, it is to their kin and ethnic community that people
turn for social, political and economic support. In a context where there
is no public social security, such behaviour has allowed politicians from
different ethnic communities to make huge capital from poverty and
‘the politics of the belly’, excluding minorities from representation in
government and hence from an avenue for material accumulation and
the location of economic and social facilities (Alubol 2000). As Abah
and Okwori suggest, it is not clear whether the problem that Nigerians
face today is that of a state without citizen – because there is no real basis
for a common Nigerian identity – or that of citizens without a state, in
that the possibility of a common identity is thwarted by powerful
sections of the elite who benefit from reinforcing ethnic divisions.
The double-edged nature of group rights is also evident in the matter
of reservations of a quota of government jobs for members of
‘untouchable’ castes in the Indian context in recognition of their
historically disadvantaged status. Beteille (1983) pointed out that
oppressed groups are not necessarily internally homogeneous and job
reservations could simply reinforce these internal inequalities. There are
not enough government jobs to benefit more than a minority of lower
caste groups, those who were least disadvantaged, so that a policy which
set out to decrease inequalities between different castes may have ended
up by increasing inequalities between individuals within these castes.
Parry, however, offers a modified ‘two cheers’ for this practice because
for all their barbed jibes about ‘quota-wallahs’ the higher castes have
found it far more difficult to dominate and discriminate against a low
caste population, many of whom have secured decent jobs and incomes,
then it had been to dominate and discriminate against an impoverished
population which was still tied to its traditional, stigmatized
occupations’ (Parry 2001, p. 162).
Feminists have also focused on the tensions between group and
individual rights which emerge once the ‘groups’ in question are de-
constructed to reveal their internal inequalities, of which gender is the
most pervasive As Nyamu-Musembi notes, the demand for individual
self-determination by women as subordinate members of their com-
munities is particularly problematic when their communities are
themselves positioned as socially subordinate groups. She cites ethno-
graphic work by Khare (1998) among ‘untouchable women in India
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who spoke of the most important right as the ‘right to survive’, which
they defined in terms of access to food, clothing, housing, education,
and secure life, ‘but not at the expense of [their] personal and com-
munity honour’. As she observes, ‘when status as a member of a
particular group is so central to how one is defined in a particular social
context, it leaves little room to speak of such an individual’s rights with-
out addressing the broader issue of the group’s status as a rights-holding
community’ (p.14).
However, this interdependency between individual and group rights
can often serve to undermine the capacity of subordinated members of
subordinated groups to press for their individual rights when to do so
appears to divide the collective struggle for recognition or to play into
hegemonic discourses which denigrate such groups. In the context of
Mexico, Belausteguigoitia (2000) draws attention to some of the
difficulties that indigenous women have had in asserting their rights as
individuals within the Zapatista movement. As we noted earlier, the
First Declaration of War of the Zapatistas’ National Liberation Army,
issued within days of the uprising in January 1994, also contained the
Revolutionary Women’s Laws which expressed a range of demands for
indigenous women, many relating to their individual rights within the
family and the community. Not all of the demands expressed in
informal forums by these women – such as ‘the right to rest’ – found
their way into these laws, and further dilution took place in subsequent
months. After the first round of negotiations between the Zapatistas and
the government, a special communique’ delivered by the official
representatives of the Zapatistas contained a very different set of
‘women’s issues’: child care centres, food for their children, kitchens
and dining halls, corn mills and tortilla pressing machines for the com-
munity, livestock, technical assistance, bakery projects, artisan work-
shops, fair prices for their crafts and transportation.
This dilution may have been a product of tactical agreement on the
part of indigenous women to give priority to the ‘larger’ struggle, or it
may have been imposed on them by the leadership in the interests of the
larger struggle but it repeats a familiar pattern. It suggests to
Belausteguigoitia that, despite the leadership’s sophisticated command
of the interconnections between global, national and local inequalities,
it was unable or unwilling to consider patriarchy as capable as capital-
ism, racialism and other hierarchies to marginalize and oppress: the
specificities of women’s demands were reduced to their roles as food
providers, educators and mothers.
It is this experience of women’s interests being constantly subsumed
within, or subordinated to, other agendas which helps to explain the
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rise of ‘autonomous’ women’s organizations in different parts of the
world. deere notes, for instance, in the context of Brazil, that until the
1980s, women agricultural workers did not have the option of joining
the trade unions if their husbands were already members, while women
who attempted to raise the issue of women’s land rights within the
Movement for the Landless were told they were being divisive and
advised to join the autonomous women’s movement (Deere 2003, cited
in Meer with Sever 2004). During the transition to democracy, women
workers did precisely this, joining an autonomous rural women’s
movement to organize around their interests as women, including a
successful campaign to include women’s rights to land within the new
Brazilian constitution.
In the Bangladesh context, Noripokkho allows women activist to
explore their own priorities and determine their own trade-offs in an
organizational space that is not dominated either by the zero-sum
politics of the mainstream parties or by the instrumentalist agendas of
the development community. Indeed, the organization’s early experiences
of attempting to work with women from political parties n which their
feminist politics was constantly subordinated to partisan politics) has led
them to steer clear of coalition politics and opt for a strategy of alliances
based on shored stands on particular issues.
Hierarchy versus indivisibility of rights
A third set of debates touched on in some of the contributions to this
book concerns the privileged status granted by mainstream liberal
theorists to civil and political rights over economic, social and cultural
rights. By contrast, the perspectives offered by these contributions
support the View that these rights are indivisible: each is essential for the
realization of others. The rationale for this is quite simply the multi-
dimensionality of power itself. Whether power is fused in the person of
the absolute monarch, as in the early European context, or operates
through institutionally differentiated relations of state, market, com-
munity and family, political disenfranchisement, social marginalization,
cultural devaluation and economic dispossession come together in
various combinations to define the condition of exclusion and
marginalization.
Consequently, as Nyamu-Musembi points out, ‘people do not
experience rights – or their deprivation – in a bifurcated manner,
distinguishing between rights of a civil-political nature and rights of an
economic-social nature’. When they protest, their protests are not
confined to one or other of these spheres, but tend to straddle them
both. Thus indigenous women in the Chiapas in Mexico framed their
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demands in terms which subverted conventional demarcations of
spheres. The Social-economic right to education was intimately linked
with the political-civil right to decide who and when to marry. The
‘public’ right of voice within their community was merged with the
‘private’ right for voice within the family. Fair returns to their job in the
market place, a demand that male workers across the world are likely to
have recognized, was premised on the right to rest from their labour, a
demand that few male workers have felt the need to articulate.
However, the indivisibility of rights does not necessarily imply their
simultaneous realization. In some cases, there may be a sequential
pattern which reflects the balance of political power in particular
contexts. In Britain, the success of the struggles of the working class for
political enfranchisement paved the way for a welfare state which
ensured the basic economic and social rights necessary to transform
workers from ‘commodities’ into citizens. In Germany, on the other
hand, modern welfarism was introduced by Bismarck in order to
undercut the growing power of the German trades unions and the
Social Democratic Party: social and economic rights thus preceded full
political enfranchisement.
In other cases, the sequence may reflect a strategic assessment of
priorities. Thus while Nijerda Kori’s analysis of injustice in Bangladesh
defines it in economic, political and social terms, the organization’s
strategy has been to begin by mobilizing poor people to claim their
economic rights as a way of building their capacity to act in more
overtly political ways, including putting up their members for local
elections. In Latin America, on the other hand, it has been observed that
earlier social movements conducted largely by peasant unions, political
parties, church groups seeking to forge class, partisan, religious and
other identities failed to politicize indigenous groups, consequently
feeding into stereotypes of Indians as submissive and backward (Yashar
1998). However, indigenous groups have mobilized actively in the
most recent round of democratization and it has been demands around
cultural rights – territorial autonomy, respect for customary low, multi-
cultural education and new forms of political representation – which
have galvanised them. Finally, in some contexts, the sequence of
struggle may simply reflect an institutional logic: the need to possess a
ration card, a land deed or a driving licence in order to enjoy other
larger rights.
Rights and duties
While most approaches to citizenship recognize that rights imply
correlative duties, they diverge on the relationship between rights vis-
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à-vis duties and on the role of the state in this relationship. Classical
liberal notions of citizenship have generally focused on rights, mainly
civil and political rights (Foweraker and Landman 1997). Such rights are
not conditional on the fulfilment of duties: individuals enjoy them by
virtue of their status as citizens, regardless of any action or inaction on
their part. Within this view, it is the duty of the state to ensure that these
rights are protected.
The role of the state was expanded with the emergence of social-
democratic welfare regimes and the extension of the definition of
citizenship to encompass social and economic rights. It was required to
assume a more pro-active role which included the promotion of the
basic social security of citizens. However, the rise of neo-conservative
thinking in the political domain in both the US and the UK in recent
years has been associated with a strong attack on the purported
dependency bred in individuals when they can rely on the state to meet
their basic needs rather than their own efforts in the market place. It has
led to a renewed emphasis on the duties of citizenship. It is argued that
since rights are not sustainable without duties, duties have to be
regarded as prior to rights and the condition for rights.
The priority given to the duty of individuals to take care of them-
selves has also led to a re-definition of the role of the state to a
protective role, that of maintaining the freedoms necessary for such
self-reliance, intervening only to support those who are incapable of
meeting their citizenship obligations through the market. Even this
latter group must however ‘earn’ their right to state support through
participation in various forms of ‘workfare’ programmes. As a result,
debates about the relationship between universality and particularism in
the sphere of public policy, which earlier took the form of a debate over
universalism versus diversity in service provision, are increasingly con-
ducted as a debate between ‘universalism’ of provision and ‘residualism’
(means-testing).
It is in this context that the expressions of citizenship articulated by
young adults in Britain have to be understood (Lister and others). Their
views appear to echo the growing emphasis on economic self- reliance
as the hall-mark of citizenship which is being articulated in the
country’s policy circles. Indeed, ethnicity and race seem to play less of a
role in defining a sense of citizenship than do economic prospects: in
other words, regardless of race and ethnicity, those who appear to be on
their way to an economically assured future are more likely to identify
themselves as full citizens than those who appear destined to experience
long periods of unemployment or employment in poorly paid, unskilled
work. Citizenship has thus come to be associated with economic
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respectability, with owning a house and paying taxes.
This new emphasis on self-reliance through individual effort in the
market-place is also evident in the contributions of those writing about
the South. It informs the neo-liberal structural adjustment policies
which have led to the promotion of market forces in many parts of the
Third World and the accompanying transfer of responsibility for social
service provision from the state to various versions of the private sector,
including various non-profit civil society organizations. In Brazil,
Dagnino points out, this has led to the co-optation of many organiza-
tions which had been at the forefront of the struggle for citizenship
rights during its transition from dictatorship to democracy. It has
displaced questions of poverty and inequality from their proper place in
the arena of public politics alongside questions of justice and citizenship,
and assigned them to the domain of technical management or
philanthropic responsibility and (as Wheeler comments) left poor and
excluded groups without the capacity to articulate their demands. In
Bangladesh, Mjera Kori has consistently refused the role of service
delivery which now characterises most non-governmental organizations
in the country, on the grounds that such a role creates relations of
dependency between civil society, organizations and their marginalized
constituencies, diverting the energies of both from the larger goals of
transforming society and democratizing the state (Kabeer).
Rights-based approaches within the policy agenda
The rise of neo-liberal versions of citizenship in the international policy
agenda has been partly countered by the parallel rise of ‘rights-based’
approaches to development, both within a number of international
development agencies as well as within national agendas. This new
discourse of rights in the context of development integrates concerns
with sustenance (economic and social rights) and freedom (political and
civil rights): while these have long been developmental concerns, a
rights-based approach adds ‘an element of accountability and culpability;
an ethical/moral dimension’ (Nycimu-Musembi).
The new 1994 constitution in South Africa is widely held up as a
model for its strong commitment to the universal basic rights of its
citizens. It is therefore appropriate that the two articles on South Africa
included in this book both grapple with the struggles to implement such
an approach in a country whose past history is one of the brutal denial
of rights to the majority of its citizens.
The challenges of implementation discussed by both Williams and
Mehto make it clear that while winning the constitutional recognition
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of universal rights is an important step in the construction of inclusive
citizenship, it is only a first step.
The article by Mehta discusses the tensions between the ‘universal’
and the particular’ as they play in the context of a commitment to
universalism as the basis of basic social needs. How, she asks, does one
operationalize the commitment to universal provision – in this case of
water – as a right, when the needs of different groups are so different.
The need for water, for instance, varies considerably in drought-prone
areas from areas which are rain-fed or irrigated. And while defining
water as a basic need appears to imply use for human consumption
rather than commercial purposes, for poor farmers, water for productive
purposes may be critical to the means by which they meet their basic
needs, so the dichotomy between commercial and consumption
becomes artificial.
One answer, of course, is that universality does not necessarily imply
uniformity. It is possible to meet a generic set of basic needs in a variety
of different ways - not simply by varying amounts allocated, but also
through very different resources. It is also worth noting that liberal
theory does not necessarily rule out Selectivism, in policy provision.
Titmus, for instance, of the key theorists of the British welfare state,
rejected negative ‘selectivism’ or the targeting of services on the basis of
individual means because it stigmatized recipients, turned them into
clients and treated them as failures (cited in Thompson and Hoggett
1996). However, he favoured ‘positive’ selectivism, or active
discrimination in favour of certain groups because of the specificity or
urgency of their needs-because he saw it as a redistributive mechanism.
It is this second approach which was reflected in the constitutional
judgement on the right to housing in the Wallacedene case documented
by Williams. Aware of the constraints imposed by the country’s socio-
economic conditions, the court did not require the state to go beyond
its available resources or to realize the right to housing immediately. But
it did insist that the state had failed in its duties because it had not
addressed the plight of the poorest and most desperate sections of the
community: ‘Those whose needs are the most urgent and whose ability
to enjoy all rights are therefore most in peril must not be ignored by the
measures aimed at achieving realization of the right’. It recommended,
in other words, a ‘bottom-up’ incrementalist approach to universal
coverage rather than an instantaneous one that could be more easily
captured by elite groups. And it pointed to some of the practical
conditions that would have to be in place to assure even this basic
incrementalism, including provisions to plan, to budget and to monitor
meeting of basic needs and management of crisis.
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Eyben deals with the somewhat different challenge of operational-
izing the right-based agenda faced by DFID, a bilateral donor agency, in
Peru, a country where its presence was small and whose government’s
commitment to such an agenda was uncertain. One key challenge such
agencies face, of course, is the issue of national sovereignty. International
convention considers interventions by external actors (such as donor
agencies) in domestic matters acceptable if such interventions are
couched in ‘technical’ terms and requested by recipient governments.
As Eyben points out, such requests are most likely to come from
governments that are concerned with strengthening democratic
processes and the respect for rights in their own countries and are
prepared to work with donors within mutually agreed frameworks.
Quite apart from the chal lenges posed by changes of government
and the government officials it was dealing with, the DFID office also
had to work out what exactly was implied by a rights-based approach in
the context of Peru. The particular interpretation it adopted appears to
accord closely with the actor-oriented approaches to rights from the
perspective of excluded actors which have featured in this book:
strengthening the organizational capacity of poor people to realize their
rights and mobilize support from influential allies within government
and civil society to promote their voice and presence within policy
processes. How this interpretation was then acted on was derived, as
Eyben puts, it from learning through practice. Some of this learning was
from attempts to build participatory processes within the policy domain
which were being carried out elsewhere in the region. As Dagnino’s
contribution also notes, some of the most innovative work in this regard
has been attempted in Brazil and includes participatory budgeting and
monitoring in local government along the lines initiated in Porto
Alegre, as well as the establishment of management councils for social
policy provision, with membership equally divided between civil
society and government at city, state and federal levels.
DFID’s experience in Peru raises an important issue. Like other
collectives, nations are not internally homogeneous and many are
characterized by extreme inequalities and repressive practices. This is
another example of the tension we noted before, where the rights of
self-determination of the collective – in this case, of the nation – may
come into direct conflict with the rights of groups and individuals
within that collective. There is, of course, a great deal of cynicism on
the part of many within the Third World governments as well as civil
society – about the rise of rights-based approaches within bilateral and
multilateral agencies as yet another ‘donor’ fad, or simply old condi-
tionalities repackaged with a new, more human face.
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On the other hand, it is also the case that attempts by external actors
with a genuine (as opposed to symbolic) commitment to promoting the
struggles of poor and excluded groups to fight for their rights are likely
to be resisted most vehemently by regimes which have least commit-
ment to the poor in their country and are least accountable to their
people. Insistence on the principle of national sovereignty offers a useful
alibi for such regimes, while appeals to the international community
over the heads of repressive governments is increasingly resorted to by
the victims of their repression. One approach that DFID has taken in
Peru to reconcile its own agenda with that of the government has been
to invoke international agreed conventions which embody the principles
that it is seeking to act on and to which Britain and Peru are signatories.
To that extent it con argue that it is merely acting within a shared
framework of ethics. In the end, however, as Eyben points out, it is the
extent to which donors open themselves up to the same principles of
transparency, coherence and accountability that they are currently
demanding of recipient countries – and the extent to which that
accountability extends to the governments and citizens of recipient
countries rather than to their own tax payers alone – that will determine
the extent to which their commitment to a right-based approach will be
perceived as legitimate and genuine.
Inclusive citizenship in an interconnected world
The narratives in this book, taken together, challenge the conventional
political science understanding of citizenship in terms of the relationship
between individuals and the state from both a sub-notional (local) as
well as a supra-national (global) perspective. First of all, from a sub-
national perspective, it is apparent that membership of the nation state
often means little to its members, compared to other forms of sub-
notional communities with which they identify and through which
they exercise their claims and obligations. This is as true for citizens of
countries like Britain where independent nationhood has a long history,
as it is for the various countries of the South who won their indepen-
dence within the past half century.
In some cases, the communities that people acknowledge, the claims
and obligations they recognize, may be very narrowly defined, restricted
to their immediate circle of family, kin, lineage and neighbours. In
others, the sense of connectedness transcends immediate or primordial
identities and coheres around shared experiences of oppression or in
solidarity with those who experience such oppression. This is a ‘societal’
understanding of the citizen as someone who belongs to different kinds
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of collective associations and defines their identity from participation in
activities associated with these different kinds of membership. Their
sense of citizenship lies in the terms on which they participate in this
collective life and the forms of agency they are able to exercise. And
where they are only able to participate on highly unequal terms, or are
denied access altogether, citizenship relates to their attempts to
challenge these exclusionary processes and bring about change. As a
number of contributions to the book make clear, while the capacity to
exercise agency at the individual level may be an important pre-
condition, it is the collective struggles of excluded groups which have
historically driven processes of social transformation.
Ansley’s contribution spells out this societal notion of citizenship
very well. Although, as she says, the example of mobilization that she
discusses was initiated by, and designed to benefit, a population of non-
citizens, and hence could not be described as an expression of their
citizenship, we con interpret her own involvement, and that of her
fellow citizens in the state of Tennessee, in the campaign to ensure the
rights of undocumented immigrants as an expression of their under-
standing of citizenship. As she points out, a great deal of the social
justice work carried out by organizations and citizens’ movements in
the US has been concerned with the rights of marginalized or sub-
ordinate groups in relation to the state as well as to other members of
society:
In good times they have fought for more expansive understandings
about things that all citizens should be able to expect from the state and
from each other, and in bad times they have defended what rights they
had against incursions by public and private power.
Dagnino is also explicit about the importance of such constructions
of ‘citizenship from below’. She points out that in Latin America (and,
it could be said, elsewhere), struggles for recognition by those groups
who were subject to cultural rules that denied them the right to have
rights led to a broadening of the terms in which the struggle for
citizenship is conducted: ‘beyond the incorporation into the political
system in the restricted sense of the formal-legal acquisition of rights’
and into ‘a project for a new sociability, a more egalitarian framework
for social relations at all levels, new rules for living together in society …
recognition of the other as a subject bearer of valid rights and legitimate
interests’. This active engagement in the wider political struggle was
seen by many as a central dimension of citizenship: for some, she points
out, it constituted the essence of citizenship, even in the absence of
formal rights.
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What emerges from these narratives is what might be called a
‘horizontal’ view of citizenship, one which stresses that the relationships
between citizens is at least as important as the more traditional ‘vertical’
view of citizenship as the relationship between the state and the
individual. Indeed, in situations where the state has proved consistently
unresponsive to the needs of its citizens, it is through the collective
action of citizens, particularly those who have been disenf ranchised by
the prevailing regime, that a more democratized vertical relationship
can be established or restored. The conundrum, of course, is how such
collective action for inclusion or transformation con be organized by
those whose exclusion is premised precisely on their lock of organiza-
tional power. In some cases, support may come from allies within the
nation state who may act on behalf of, or with, excluded groups. In
others, it may take on more global forms of solidarity.
This takes me to the second challenge to conventional state-centred
views of citizenship presented by some of the contributions in this
book, one which is posed by growing inter-connections at the global
level. These inter-connections take a number of different forms. Inter-
connections which reflect the shared global environment reflect the fact
that decisions taken within the boundaries of a nation state regarding
the management of non-renewable resources con have impacts that go
well beyond national boundaries (Eyben). The forces of economic
globalization are evident in Ansley’s discussion of the flow of
undocumented migrants into the United States, and touched on briefly
in Kabeer’s discussion of the emergence of export-oriented shrimp
production in Bangladesh. A number of articles deal with the globaliza-
tion of the neo-liberal economic world view through the ascendance of
these ideas within national governments or their imposition through
donor conditionalities.
However, counteracting these processes are various global inter-
connections of a different kind, interconnections which represent an
active solidarity across national boundaries. The phenomenal ability of
the Zapatistas to mobilize international support, partly through their
mastery of the new forces of technology, not only brought their cause
to the attention of the world but served to provide them with some
protection in the face of a repressive state. Other examples of such
global interconnections discussed in the book include the attempts by
the DFID office in Peru to support nascent struggles for citizenship by
excluded groups within the country; Mjera Kori’s participation in
international networks to oppose the unregulated industrialization of
shrimp production and the consequent human rights violations; and the
way in which women’s organizations across the world have sought to
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negotiate their way between the customs and lows within their
countries and those spelt out in international conventions (Nyamu-
Musembi). Nor is it only women’s organizations in the south that can
make strategic use of international conventions. As Calman (1987)
points out, US feminists could benefit from pushing the US to ratify
many of the key international human rights conventions, including the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (which it has not yet ratified, although it was signed by Carter
in 1980), because many of these are far more favourable to women than
US law.
To some extent, it is the construction of global policy/political
regimes ‘from above’ to ensure the free flow of international capital
which has made a necessary alternative set of global interconnections
‘from below’. A great deal of the politics of globalization from above as
well as below is focused on contestations around the kinds of rights and
duties that are appropriate in an increasingly globalized world. One
obvious focus concerns the rights of labour to the some kind of
unfettered mobility that is currently enjoyed by capital (Ansley). While
an apparently logical solution to, on the one hand, the need of richer
countries for labour to do the jobs its own citizens are unable or
unwilling to do and, on the other, the need of poorer countries to find
employment for their citizens, such a right still remains an apparent
political impossibility. Contestations also focus on the rights of indige-
nous groups to their collective knowledge, the rights of labour to some
degree of protection from global market forces, the rights of citizens to
unpolluted environments and so on.
The other important question concerns the duties associated with
globalization. Globalization increasingly means that many policy
decisions taken within one country about the environment, about
taxation, about social protection, about labour standards – are likely to
have repercussions in others. There is clearly a need for greater co-
ordination of responsibility at the global level. However, for nations to
buy in to the idea of global responsibility comes up against the problem
of resources and incentives. Why should individual nations act in
globally responsible ways, to take (or refrain from taking) actions in the
interests of the global community, if such actions go against their
national interests or strain their national capacity?
Clearly there has to be a framework of global citizenship which
induces countries to act in globally responsible ways and which ensures
that they have the resources necessary to carry out these responsibilities.
A framework of global clientilism based on foreign assistance, which is
essentially how relations between rich and poor countries are presently
Kabeer 01  11/9/04  10:22 am  Page 24
Introduction \ 25
conducted, is unlikely to command the allegiance of client governments
or of their citizens. Foreign assistance is exactly that; it is premised on
the some dependency relationships at the global level that charity entails
at the national, similarly subject to whims and arbitrary decisions,1
incapable of sustaining a long-term vision of global responsibility.
Despite various controversies, including controversies over its
‘fortress’ mentality, the European Union has received a great deal of
attention in this regard because it is one – perhaps the only – attempt in
the contemporary era to forge a supranational association which is based
on more than trading relationships (Mishra 1998; UNRISD 1997;
Linklater 1998). It embodies a vision of political, social and economic
integration between member states bound by common rules, including
a charter of fundamental human rights, backed by necessary redistri-
butive mechanisms. There is no doubt that the reality falls short of the
vision – the Common Agricultural Policy, for instance, penalizes EU
taxpayers and consumers as well as Third World farmers – but it
nevertheless serves to make an important point. Members of the Union
may not exercise the some clout as each other but they are members,
nevertheless, not clients. They are required, as the basis of membership,
to subscribe to certain common principles and practices, including the
principles and practices of citizenship, and there are redistributive
mechanisms to ensure that all members are able to fulfil their obligations.
Global citizenship also requires rules which spell out the claims and
obligations of membership and ensure redistribution as a matter of right
rather then discretion. It requires measures of the kind proposed by the
Brandt Commission at the end of the 1970s and more recently by a
number of countries at the Monterey conference on financing for
development that countries be taxed on a sliding scale related to
national income in order to generate revenue for a global social fund.
Ultimately it is only within this framework of a global community based
on mutual rights and responsibilities that the idea of a ‘rights-based’
approach to development will make sense. Short of this, attempts to
promote the idea of rights in development will continue to appear to
many poor countries as simply conditionality with a human face’.
Note
1 It is worth noting as a footnote to Eyben’s chapter on DFID’s activities in Peru
that the office has now been closed down as DFID transfers its resources and
capacity to waging peace in Iraq
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